As elites antes dos fascismos
«In the very early stages, when preindustrial, ancien régime-based upper strata were still powerful, they attempted to rule according to an overtly atavistic system of semifeudal privilege. The set of oligarchic families crowding around the Greek throne (the tzakia, as they were known) and literally owning and running the Greek state is perhaps the ultimate example of this phenomenon. The tzakia even managed to survive the sweeping 1864 electoral reforms by a form of vote control. Its Spanish counterpart was the institution of political bossism known as caciquismo. Although it would be an overly simplistic view of any Mediterranean country to describe it as dominated by a handful of families, at least in one case, Portugal, the role of oligarchic lineages and family coteries in the power structure of the state played a vital role until recently.» (p. 20)
«Unlike the Social Democrats in Northern and Central Europe, anarchists, Socialists and other system-challenging movements – Left and Right – in the South were never offered the chance of entering into a real and lasting compromise, save perhaps in Italy in 1910 and 1911. […] Under circumstances of societal “dualism”, reform and modernization occurred through an exceedingly slow process of accommodation betweenthe interests of the ruling classes and the pressures from below. The dominant interests included the maintenance of low wages, the avoidance of agrarian reform whenever possible, and advantageous private participation in state-sponsored projects through loans and other means.» (p. 22)
«Pressure from below included, of course, the workers’ movement, middle-class revolutionary intellectuals, and academic and peasant unrest. The built-in lag in responsiveness explains the enormous volume of accumulated contradictions that characterized Southern European societies on the eve of Fascism. On the one hand, some essencial structural changes, such as agrarian reform, had not taken place at all. […] On the other hand, little or no effort was made to meet the demands of a sizeable industrial sector, with its urban proletariat and a small but growing middle class. In the specific sense of these cleavages, but not in the sense that there were “two” societies and “two” economic orders in each country, the Southern European region possessed a degree of structural dualism.» (p. 22)
Salvador Giner, Political Economy, Legitimation and the State in Southern Europe, in Guillermo O’Donnell, Philippe C. Schmitter e Laurence Whitehead (1986), Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Southern Europe, Johns Hopkins.